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Abstract—As ad-hoc networks have different characteristics from a wired network, the intrusion detection 
techniques used for wired networks are no longer sufficient and effective when adapted directly to a 
wireless ad-hoc network. In this article, first τhe security challenges in intrusion detection for ad-hoc 
networks are identified and the related work for anomaly detection is discussed. We then propose a 
layered intrusion detection framework, which consists of collection, detection and alert modules that are 
handled by local agents. The collection, detection and alert modules are uniquely enabled with the main 
operations of ad-hoc networking, which are found at the OSI link and network layers. The proposed 
modules are based on interpolating polynomials and linear threshold schemes. An experimental evaluation 
of these modules shows their efficiency for several attack scenarios, such as route logic compromise, 
traffic patterns distortion and denial of service attacks.   
Index Terms— ad-hoc networks, collection, detection and alert modules, framework.  
——————————      —————————— 
 
1. Introduction 
An ad-hoc network is a collection of nodes that can be rapidly deployed as a multi-hop 
packet radio network without the aid of any existing network infrastructure or 
centralized administration. Therefore, the interconnections between nodes are capable 
of changing on a continuous and arbitrary basis. Unlike networks using dedicated nodes 
to support basic functions like packet forwarding, routing, and network management, in 
ad-hoc networks these functions are carried out by all available nodes [11, 12]. 
Applications of ad-hoc networks range from military tactical operations to civil rapid 
development, such as emergency search-and-rescue missions, data collection/sensor 
networks, and instantaneous classroom/meeting room applications.  
The nature of the ad-hoc environment makes it vulnerable to an adversary’s 
malicious attacks. Such networks are susceptible to attacks ranging from passive 
eavesdropping to active interfering. Unlike wired networks where an adversary must 
gain physical access to the network wires or pass though several lines of defense at 
firewalls and gateways, attacks on a wireless network can come from any direction and 
target all nodes. Therefore ad-hoc networks do not have a clear line of defense, and 
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every node must be prepared for encounters with an adversary directly or indirectly [11, 
12]. 
In ad-hoc networks nodes are receptive to being captured, compromised, and 
hijacked since they are units capable of roaming independently. Since tracking down 
mobile nodes is difficult to achieve, attacks by compromised nodes are far more 
damaging and much harder to detect. Therefore, the nodes and the network 
infrastructure must be prepared to operate in a non-trusting mode. Furthermore, the lack 
of a centralized authority gives ground to adversaries to exploit new types of attacks and 
to break the required for efficient operations cooperative algorithms.  
In this article, we propose a layered intrusion detection framework (LIDF) to detect 
compromised and malicious nodes in an ad-hoc network. LIDF is enabled with the main 
operations of ad-hoc networking, which are found at the Open System Interconnection 
(OSI) link layer with one-hop connectivity / frame transmission and network layer with 
routing / data packet forwarding. LIDF consists of collection, detection and alert 
modules that operate locally in every node in an ad-hoc network. These modules collect, 
detect and inform neighboring nodes for their possible compromised status. The 
collection and storage of audit data is performed with the use of a binary tree. The 
detection is achieved with Lagrange interpolating polynomials and the alert is 
accomplished with linear threshold schemes. Experimental results prove the 
effectiveness of our approach. 
Following this introduction, this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents 
an introduction to intrusion detection and focuses on anomaly detection as the most 
related work that applies to ad-hoc networks. Section 3 describes the detection 
framework and discusses how the collection, detection and alert modules operate. 
Section 4 presents and discusses the experimental results. Finally, section 5 concludes 
the article with a review of our contribution and suggestions for future research.   
 
2. Intrusion Detection Challenges 
When a set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality, or 
availability of a mobile node takes place, intrusion prevention techniques, such as 
encryption and authentication, are usually the first line of defense. However, intrusion 
prevention alone is not sufficient when systems become more complex and as security 
is often the after-thought. There are always weaknesses in the systems due to design and 
programming errors, or various “socially engineered” penetration techniques [2, 3, 12]. 
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For example, even though exploitable “buffer overflow” security holes, which can 
lead to an unauthorized root shell, were first reported many years ago they still exist in 
some recently released system software. Furthermore, as illustrated by the Distributed 
Denial-of-Services (DDoS) attacks launched against major Internet sites where security 
measures were in place, the protocols and systems that are designed to provide services 
are inherently subject to these attacks [6, 9]. Intrusion detection can be used as a second 
wall to protect network systems because once an intrusion is detected, a response can 
then be put into place to minimize damages. 
By definition, intrusion detection involves capturing data and reasoning about the 
evidence in the data to determine whether the system is under attack [12, 15]. The most 
important difference between fixed and ad-hoc networks is perhaps that the latter do not 
have a fixed infrastructure. Compared to wired networks where traffic monitoring is 
usually done at switches, routers and gateways in a network-based intrusion detection 
system (IDS), the mobile ad-hoc environment does not have such traffic concentration 
points and therefore only host-based IDS can be used.   
While network-based IDS listen on the network, capture and examine individual 
packets flowing through a network, host-based IDS [8, 12, 15, 25] are concerned with 
what is happening on each individual node. They are able to detect actions such as 
repeated failed access attempts or changes to critical system files, and they normally 
operate by accessing log files or monitoring real-time system usage.  
Intrusion detection techniques are categorized into misuse detection and anomaly 
detection [17, 18]. Misuse detection bases its idea on precedence, rules and misuse 
detectors that look for behavior which matches the already known attack scenario. A 
typical misuse detection system takes in audit data for analysis and compares these data 
to large databases of attack signatures. The attack signatures, or known attack patterns, 
are normally specified as rules with respect to timing information. If any comparison 
between the audit data and the known attack patterns results in a match, an intrusion 
alarm setting sounds. This type of detection systems is as good as the database of attack 
signatures that it uses to compare to. 
Furthermore, misuse detection systems use patterns of well-known attacks or weak 
spots of the system to match and identify known intrusions [21]. For example, a 
signature rule for the “guessing password attack” can be “there are more than 4 failed 
login attempts within 2 minutes”. The main advantage of misuse detection is that it can 
accurately and efficiently detect instances of known attacks whereas its main 
disadvantage is that it lacks the ability to detect the newly invented attacks.  
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Anomaly detection bases its idea on statistical behavior. Anomaly detectors look for 
behavior that deviates from normal system use [26, 27]. A typical anomaly detection 
system takes in audit data for analysis. The audit data is transformed to a format 
statistically comparable to the profile of a user. Initially, the user’s profile is generated 
dynamically by the system and it is subsequently updated based on the user’s usage. 
Thresholds are always associated to all the profiles. If any comparison between the audit 
data and the user’s profile results in a deviation that crosses a set threshold, an intrusion 
alarm is set. This type of detection systems is well suited to detect unknown or 
previously not encountered attacks [15, 18, 20]. 
For example, the normal profile of a user may contain the averaged frequencies of 
some system command used in his or her login sessions. If for a session that is being 
monitored, the frequencies are significantly lower or higher, then an anomaly alarm will 
be raised. The main advantage of anomaly detection is that it does not require prior 
knowledge of intrusion and it can, thus, detect new intrusions whereas its main 
disadvantage is that it may not be able to describe what the attack is and it may have a 
high false positive rate.  
2.1.  Related Work 
The intrusion detection techniques that are presented in this section are chosen due to 
their suitability for anomaly detection. Anomaly detection is the main approach for 
intrusion detection in ad-hoc networks because in this new environment intrusions will 
come in the form of new attack, i.e. attacks that have not yet been defined. Moreover, 
specification-based anomaly detection [28] is a hybrid combination of anomaly-
detection and knowledge-based intrusion detection techniques that mitigate the 
weaknesses of the two approaches while magnifying their strengths. This method uses a 
logic-based description of expected behavior to construct a profile based on human 
behavior or expertise. The authors in [29] built application software for online attack 
identification without debilitating waits for anti-virus updates or software patches. 
In ad-hoc networks, intrusion detection is based on statistical anomaly detection, 
rather than misuse detection, because of the perceived difficulties of continually 
updating misuse detection rules (or signatures). If an intrusion warrants a broader 
investigation, nodes are expected to trigger the cooperation of other nodes for global-
scale intrusion detection. A likely algorithm for performing this task collects observed 
data from all the nodes about the suspected node, and then weighs the majority 
consensus to determine whether an intrusion has occurred. In [27], for example, each 
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node concurrently runs a software agent that monitors its own system activities as well 
as traffic among neighboring nodes within its radio range. Each node also analyzes its 
own data for local intrusion detection. 
The authors of [13] proposed the idea of ad-hoc nodes monitoring their neighboring 
nodes’ packet-forwarding behavior in what they called a watchdog process.  After a 
node forwards a packet, the watchdog monitors the next node to verify that the packet is 
forwarded again. This scheme assumes source routing with each packet carrying its 
route information so that the watchdog knows a tracked packet’s proper route. If a 
watchdog observes that a neighboring node drops more packets than a given threshold, 
the node is deemed to be misbehaving. 
In the systems presented in [1] and [19] each node maintains a “malcount” for 
neighboring nodes, i.e. the number of observed occurrences of misbehavior. When a 
node’s malcount exceeds a given threshold, its neighbors send out an alert to the other 
nodes, which then check their malcounts for the suspected node. If a suspected node 
triggers two or more alerts, it is deemed to be malicious. Naturally, this scheme works 
only if at least two trustworthy nodes observe a suspected node; it can fail if malicious 
nodes send out false alerts. 
In [4] the Confidant scheme was proposed, which, similar to the previous 
approaches, relies on ad-hoc nodes to monitor their neighboring nodes’ routing 
behavior. Source routing is assumed, so that nodes know the correct route for tracked 
packets. Confidant’s innovation is a reputation system that works with network 
monitoring. This system consists of a table of observed nodes and their reputation 
ratings. If a node is observed to be misbehaving (deviating from its expected routing 
behavior), the reputation system changes the node’s rating by a weighting function 
depending on the new observation’s trustworthiness. 
The Mobile Intrusion Detection System (MobIDS) [8, 10, 17] is   similar to the 
other schemes described here. Multiple sensors in the ad-hoc network keep track of 
observed instances of the nodes’ behavior. In MobIDS, though counts from multiple 
sensors are combined with a weighting function reflecting the different sensors’ 
credibility to create a local rating for a suspect node. These local ratings are then 
distributed periodically via broadcasting to the neighboring nodes. Each node averages 
the local ratings it receives into global ratings for other nodes. Nodes are deemed to be 
misbehaving if their ratings drop below a given threshold. 
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There are certain difficulties in realizing all these schemes. First, there is no clear 
separation between normalcy and anomaly in a mobile environment. A node that sends 
out false routing information could be the one that has been compromised, or merely the 
one that is temporarily out of synchronization due to a likely volatile physical 
movement Second, these schemes are only useful to prevent intruders from the outside 
(external attacks) and they are not useful when an internal node is compromised 
(internal attack). Third, due to the bandwidth limitations, battery constraints and 
frequent disconnects, users often adopt new operation modes such as disconnected 
operations. This suggests that existing anomaly detection models may not be able to 
determine that such new operations are certified and subsequently identify them as 
intrusions. 
 
3. Layered Intrusion Detection Framework  
The layered intrusion detection framework (LIDF) presented in this article is designed 
especially for ad-hoc networks by taking into considerations the characteristics of ad-
hoc networks and the problems that existing IDS systems face when deployed in a 
wireless environment. The dynamic and cooperative nature of ad-hoc networks suggests 
that LIDF should be designed in a dynamically and cooperative fashion. In a wireless 
environment each node should have its own intrusion detection engine to help it 
perform intrusion detection since it cannot rely on other nodes that may leave the 
network at anytime. Ad-hoc networks also do not have traffic concentration points that 
allow for intrusion detection at a centralized location, a fact that further emphasizes the 
need for each node to have it own intrusion detection module.  
Similar to [8, 15, 25], intrusion detection is to be performed locally via a local agent 
on each node utilizing the partial, localized audit data since this is the most reliable 
source of audit data for a node. Each node can then perform cooperative intrusion 
detection when more information is required from other nodes to confirm the intrusion. 
For cooperative intrusion detection, the individual node is required to work with 
neighboring nodes to gather more audit data for intrusion detection. This suggests that 
there should be a secure communication channel between the nodes participating in the 
cooperative intrusion detection. 
LIDF should be interoperable with existing intrusion detection systems, since an ad-
hoc network can be deployed in an environment that contains different types of 
networks (e.g. a university campus), which are interconnected and have already existing 
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intrusion detection systems running on them. Allowing the exchange of audit data and 
other information between the different systems may increase the overall effectiveness 
of intrusion detection in the entire environment. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, LIDF consists of the following components; a collection 
module, a detection module and an alert module. The collection module collects data at 
the OSI link and network layers. Information in needed from both these two different 
layers to perform layered intrusion detection. Layered intrusion detection is necessary as 
certain attacks that target the upper layer may seem perfectly legitimate to the lower 
layers. For example, a DDoS attack that targets the network layer of an ad-hoc network 
seems legitimate to the link layer that handles node connectivity.  
 
 
Fig. 1 – Intrusion Detection Framework 
 
In mobile nodes intrusion detection should be done on the basis of different levels of 
escalation, starting from the simplest and least battery consuming intrusion detection 
operation to the more complex and CPU intensive operations. The detection module 
processes the most relevant audit data collected from the different layers based on the 
mode that the mobile node is currently operating in.  
In an anomaly detection scenario, when an intrusion is detected, the system needs to 
respond immediately locally on the neighboring hosts. The neighboring nodes can then 
respond to the intrusion either locally or cooperatively. The alert module is also 
necessary when the node needs to perform intrusion detection cooperatively as well as 
when it has to sound a global alarm to the ad-hoc network. This can be achieved with 
the main protocol operations of ad-hoc networking.  
Our proposed intrusion detection framework is closely related to the main 
operations of ad-hoc networking, which  mainly take place at the OSI link layer (one-
hop connectivity and frame transmission) and at the OSI network layer (routing and 
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data packet forwarding) [11]. Data link layer protocols maintain connectivity between 
neighboring nodes and ensure the correctness of frames transferred, whereas routing 
protocols exchange routing data between nodes and maintain routing states at each node 
accordingly. Based on the routing states, data packets are forwarded by intermediate 
nodes along an established route to the destination.  
These operations comprise of link and network operations that integrate a 
framework for local and cooperative intrusion detection. When link and/or network 
operations take place in the ad-hoc network, the data collection, detection and alert 
modules presented in detail in the next sections are enabled. In particular, when a new 
neighbour is detected by a link layer protocol and when routing states are updated by a 
network layer protocol of a node, the collection, detection and alert modules are 
enabled.  
Summarising, once the data is collected (section 3.1) a unique polynomial is 
generated with Lagrange interpolation techniques. Next, a secret function is selected 
based on the unique polynomial and the detection module checks whether the secret 
function converges at point of intersection with the specified polynomial. If it converges 
the node is considered to be compromised, else valid (section 3.2). In addition, the 
response module broadcasts to the neighbouring nodes the secret function, the shares 
and the polynomial coefficients using discrete logs and linear threshold schemes so as 
nodes can check the status of the source node. 
3.1. Collection Module  
The data collection module aims at collecting audit data in a coordinate format, (x, y), to 
create a tree structure and at exhibiting the existence of a polynomial for interpolation 
with unevenly spaced data. Data are aggregated into pairs that describe the changes in 
the routing table of a node. Thus, we have defined a two-dimensioned coordinate 
system (xi, yi), where the xi – coordinate denotes the i
th
 data value, or point, of route 
cashes (i.e. specific routes to neighbouring nodes) and the yi – coordinate denotes the i
th
 
data point of traffic patterns (i.e. number of packets forwarded).   
As mentioned in the previous section, the data  are locally collected in every node 
when one-hop connectivity and/or routing are taking place in each node. Thus, data may 
contain values that are not equivalently spaced as the result of observations. Assuming 
that the x-coordinates of the points are distinct a unique interpolating polynomial 
between the points will always exist. 
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The assertion of our assumption for distinct points can be guaranteed with a binary 
tree structure, which collects and stores the data as illustrated in Figure 2. Figure 2 
shows an example of a tree structure with 11 elements. Since the structure is a tree, 
every node is either a leaf or a parent of one or two children nodes. The root is at level   
l = 0 and its height is h, where h = 4.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2 – An example of the binary tree structure 
 
When a node is connected to an ad-hoc network, it creates a local tree with only 3 
members; the root and its two children. The left leaf (number 2) of the root is activated 
whereas the right leaf (number 3) is deactivated, when frame transmission is taking 
place. Then, the next audit pair of data (xi, yi) and (xj, yj) for xi ≠ xj is stored in the new 
leaves at positions 4 and 5 and so forth. Furthermore, the right leaf of the root with 
number 3 is activated, whereas the left leaf is deactivated when routing and packet 
forwarding   take place in the ad-hoc network. Similarly, the pair of data (xi, yi) and (xj, 
yj) for xi ≠ xj are stored in the leaves with numbers 6 and 7. For xi = xj, the xi coordinate 
is increased by one, i.e., xi = xj + 1 and stored in the tree.  
For example, the audit pair data (xi, yi) retrieve their values from the percentages of 
routing and traffic parameters (i.e. change of node distance (DIST); change of route 
entries (PCR); change of traffic (PSTC); change of number of hops (PCH); change of 
bad routes (PCB); change of updated routes (PCU); and change of stale routes(PCS)). 
Each time left or right leaf is activated (xi, yi) and (xj, yj) are assigned values based on 
the equations 1 and 2. 
 
xi = PCR + PSTC + PCH mod 101    (1) 
yi = PCB + PCU + PCS mod 101    (2) 
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Based on equations 1 and 2, we have collected the following unique data points at 
tree level l = 2 of figure 2: (21, 54), (43, 45), (73, 48), and (91, 27). When data from 
both layers are collected, the detection module is activated and it then processes the data 
from the tree. 
 
3.2. Detection Module 
The collected data of the collection module form a set of data points which represent a 
unique polynomial. The data points that have created the binary tree of Figure 2 are 
uniquely interpolated between those data points. The detection module selects the most 
recent pair data that have been collected when the link and network operations were 
enabled. In figure 2, for example, the detector will use only the data from the second 
level (l = 2) with h = 3 to construct a unique polynomial. Data in the third level (l = 3) 
with h = 4 do not form a representative data sample since they had been collected only 
when link layer operations were taken place.  
The detection module checks whether the constructed polynomial converges in a 
specified interval (i.e. defined by a secret function). If it converges, the node is 
considered to be compromised else the node is assumed valid. A mathematical 
description and notation follows in the next   paragraphs. 
By definition, a polynomial interpolation is the interpolation of a given data set by a 
polynomial [14]. Given a set of n + 1 data points (xi, yi) where no two xi are the same, 
we are looking for a polynomial p of degree at most n with the property 
niyxp ii ,...,0,)( == . Suppose that the interpolation polynomial we create from the tree 
is in the form: 
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which expresses a system of linear equations in the coefficients an. We need to solve 
this system for an to construct the interpolant p(x). Since the matrix on the left which is 
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commonly referred to as a Vandermonde matrix has non-zero determinant [14], it can 
be easily shown that there exists a unique interpolating polynomial.  
In order to find the coefficients an for the interpolating polynomial we must solve 
the above matrix equation in the vector space ∏n, which is the vector space of 
polynomials of degree n. Since this is a costly operation in clock cycles and considering 
that the detection module is encapsulated in wireless nodes of an ad-hoc network we 
construct an interpolation polynomial in the Lagrange form [14]. (Note that all 
mathematical operations are performed in the finite field of integers Zq (where q is a 
prime)). 
The interpolation polynomial L(x) can be mathematically represented as a linear 
combination: 
qxlyxL
n
j
jj mod)()(
0
∑==          (5) 
of Lagrange basis polynomials: 
q
xx
xx
xl
n
iji ij
i
j mod)(
,0
∏≠= −−=          (6) 
given a set of n+1 data points (xi, yj) where the xi values must be distinct. The 
interpolation polynomial in Lagrange form for a specific number of points n = 2, 3, 4, 5 
in the form (xi, yj) can be graphically illustrated as in Figure 3.  
 
 
Fig. 3 – Interpolation polynomials in Lagrange form 
 
In the detection module, it is essential to discover for which (x1, …, xi) the sequence of 
interpolating polynomials uniformly converges. Particularly, it is necessary to determine 
for which pairs (xi, yj) L (x) converges. If the convergent points are found, the detection 
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module can identify the status (i.e. compromised) of the node. A node is considered to 
be compromised if the convergence points (xi, yj) of L (x) fall under the right side of a 
secret function f (x), which is  defined by the detection module (see Figure 4).  
It is known that for any function f (x) continuous on an interval [a, b] ∈ Zq there 
exists a table of xi for which the sequence of interpolating polynomials L(x) converges 
to f (x) uniformly on [a, b]. This is due to the Weierstrass approximation and the 
Chebyshev alternance theorems [14]. The Weiestrass approximation theorem states that 
the sequence of polynomials of best approximation )(* xpn  converges to f (x) and the 
Chebyshev alternance theorem states that such polynomials intersect f (x) at least n + 1 
times. Choosing the points of intersection as interpolation points, we obtain the 
interpolating polynomial L(x) in its Lagrange form. This polynomial coincides with the 
best approximation polynomial.  
Let us define a linear secret function f (k) to be in set K of secrets k∈K that intersects 
L(x) in at least n points: ∑−=− += 211)( ni in akakf          (7) 
where pn Zaaa ∈−121 ,...,,  are the coefficients of the polynomial L(x) of degree n-1. Since 
L(x) is of degree n-1, it intersects f (k) in n points.  
Next, it is essential to determine when L(x) converges. Based on the convergence 
theorem [14], L(x) converges uniformly in [a, b] if there exists a < ε < b such that ε<− )()( kfxL . An example of L(x) and f (k) is depicted in Figure 4.  
L(x)
f (k)
x
y
100
50
10050
 
Fig. 4 – Uniformly convergence of L(x) with respect to f (k)  
 
In Figure 4, the polynomial L(x) is graphically represented by the curve whereas the 
secret function f (k) is presented by the straight line. In the example of section 3.1 we 
have collected the unique data points (21, 54), (43, 45), (73, 48), (91, 27) and thus, we 
can easily substitute and calculate equations 5 and 6 for q = 101. While our detection 
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module “observed” the normal behaviour of the network, including node joining, 
leaving and speeding in the ad hoc network, function f (k) was calculated by equation 7: 
 
f (k) = 4/3k + 20         (8) 
 
Once the detection module has determined whether the node has been compromised or 
not, the alert module is responsible for distributing the node’s status to the neighbouring 
nodes.  
3.3. Alert Module 
When each node is connected for the first time to an ad-hoc network, the data collector 
passes the audit data to the detector and the alert module informs its neighboring nodes 
that the new entering node has been compromised. At this stage, every new entering 
node is considered to be compromised unless proven otherwise. A node’s compromised 
status does not allow gaining access to specific applications or services in the ad-hoc 
network. 
The proposed alert module enables nodes to perform cooperatively intrusion 
detection as well as to carry out a global alarm to the ad-hoc network with the use of a 
linear threshold scheme. Linear threshold schemes have been mainly applied in the 
distribution of shares of a secret to a set of shareholders such that the secret is a linear 
combination of the shares [14]. The necessary mathematical notation follows in the next 
paragraphs.  
An (m, n) linear threshold scheme distributes a secret to a set of n shareholders, or 
nodes in the ad-hoc context, such that the secret is a linear combination of the shares of 
any m nodes. In equation 7, we have defined the secret function f (k), which determines 
whether a node has been compromised or not, to be in a set K of secrets, k ∈ K, and we 
have assumed that each node i is in the set P (|P| = n) of nodes. Similar to [14] in order 
to distribute f (k), we generate a share si, which is constructed with an index shift by 
equations 5 and 7, for i ∈ P with a polynomial a (i): ∑−=+= 11)( ml lli iakfs           (9) 
where si is in the set Si of shares, and Si is in the set S of share sets. For linear threshold 
schemes, Si = Sj for all i, j ∈ P [14]. To reconstruct f (k), we combine si for all i in an 
authorized subset B (|B| = n) of P and use Lagrange interpolation:     
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∑∈= Bi ii skf )()( ψ   where   ∏≠∈ −= ilBli il l,ψ .          (10) 
ψi is a homomorphism from Si to K. For linear threshold schemes, the 
homeomorphisms are multiplications by a scalar ψi. In addition, we utilize a 
homomorphic commitment function C(x) that maps from the plaintext to the ciphertext 
and is hard to invert. Assuming that the computation of discrete logs in a finite field is 
intractable, we use the commitment function: 
xgxC =)(         (11) 
where g is a generator of Zp: 
pbgpapb a mod:}1,...,1{}1,...,1{ ≡−∈∃−∈∀      (12) 
The alert module broadcasts the commitment to the secret g
f(k)
, the shares i
s
g , and 
the coefficients of the polynomials )1(1 ... −maa gg . The nodes j ∈ P then verify that:  
      ∏−=≡ 11)( )(mi liakfs ii ggg            (13) 
for each i ∈ B, and that: ∏=≡ 1)( )(i skf iigg ψ , where ∏≠∈ −≡ ilBli il l,ψ .      (14) 
The alert protocol can also be used for cooperative intrusion detection where the 
individual node is required to work with neighboring nodes to gather more audit data for 
detection purposes. In the same manner as before, audit data can be distributed among 
the nodes based on the alert protocol. However, the corporate intrusion detection 
requires each node to have at least three neighboring nodes for data collection in order 
to minimize the possibility of fraud by the compromised and/or malicious node(s). For 
example, a compromised node will send malicious data to the neighboring node in order 
to fool the detection mechanism. However, the malicious node does not know the secret 
function and, thus, it can only guess the data with a 50% probability. 
To prove that only valid nodes can create a valid subshare, which in our case is 
another k and, thus, f (k), let us assume that we know the shares si of the nodes i ∈ B and 
the coefficients of the polynomial ai used by i to distribute the shares si. We could then 
interpolate the m-1 degree polynomial that another node could have used to distribute 
shares s΄j of f (k) to n΄ new nodes j ∈ P΄ directly. Suppose that each i ∈ B broadcasts the 
same information. Each j ∈ P΄ then verifies that s΄j is a valid share of f (k) with the 
following equation:  
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Equation 15 follows from equations 13, 14 and the homomorphic properties of 
exponentiation. Since finding discrete logs is intractable, no j can learn f (k) from the 
broadcast of g
f(k)
. In the check suggested by equation 15, the m nodes i ∈ B prove that 
they distributed valid subshares of valid shares to the n΄ new nodes j ∈ P΄. Hence, only 
a valid node can create a valid subshare. Carrying on the example of sections 3.1 and 
3.2 and selecting k = 12, we can calculate f (k) (equation 8), generate a share si (equation 
9) and choose generator g = 20 to distribute and to validate f (k) based on equations 14 
and 15. 
As the number of nodes increases, corporate intrusion detection creates an overhead 
to the ad hoc network. Considering that each node has at least three neighbouring nodes 
in current implementation, we found that the subshares distribution triples the network 
overhead. In corporate intrusion detection, it is not essential nodes to distribute all 
subshares, which demonstrate their full status, but parts of them following the 
verification process of equations 13, 14 and 15. Experimental results showed that we 
could still achieve the detection rates of section 4 (Tables II, III, IV) while distributing 
half of the states involved with an increase of 1.5 to the total network overhead. Further 
decrease of the distributed subshares, resulted to a detection rate of less than 90%.  
  
4 Experimental Results 
In this study, we evaluate the effectiveness of our approach by considering attacks on 
routing protocols and specifically the route logic compromise, traffic pattern distortion 
and denial of service attacks. In the route logic compromise attack, routing information 
is manipulated by parsing false route messages or by maliciously changing routing 
cache information. In the traffic pattern distortion attack, packets are maliciously 
dropped. In the denial of service attack, specific node(s) are unavailable to route 
information to neighboring nodes. We use data on the node’s physical movement and 
the corresponding change in its routing table as the basis of the trace data.  
The routing table change is measured mainly by the percentage of changed routes 
(PCR) and the percentage of changes in the sum of hops of all routes (PCH). During the 
tracing process the trace data are gathered for each node and aggregated into a single 
data set, which describes the changes in the routing tables for all the nodes. The 
detection module which is learned from this aggregated data set is capable of operating 
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on any node in the network. A poor performance of the anomaly detection model with a 
high false alarm rates indicates that the gathered data (including both training and 
testing processes) are not sufficient and the modeling algorithms need to be refined. 
To study the effectiveness of our approach, we have implemented anomaly 
detection in the Network Simulator, ns-2, software using three popular proactive and on-
demand routing protocols, mainly  the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol [20], 
the Ad-Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing (AODV) protocol [1, 19], and the 
Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector Routing (DSDV) protocol [24, 25].  
DOS Attack DOS Attack
DOS Attack
DOS Attack
Route Logic 
Compromise
Route Logic 
Compromise
Traffic distortion
Traffic distortion
 
Fig. 5 – Simulation Environment for the Ad Hoc Network  
 
In order to compare among different protocols, we consider the same traffic and 
topological information but we allow a slight deviation to make maximum utilization of 
the routing information, since even under the same variables, protocols operate in a 
slightly different manner. For example, PCH is the percentage of change in the number 
of total intermediate hops from all source routes cashed in DSR, but the percentage of 
changes of sum of metrics (i.e. PCB, PCS, and PCU of Table I) to all reachable  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE II 
DETECTION PERFORMANCE ON DSR 
Running  
Time (s) 
Detection Rate False Alarm Rate 
100000 95 ± 3.99% 3.451 ± 0.33% 
200000 96 ± 3.25% 3.764 ± 0.22% 
300000 96 ± 3.56% 2.152 ± 0.75% 
400000 97 ± 2.57% 2.326 ± 0.72% 
500000 97 ± 2.35% 2.955 ± 0.24% 
600000 97 ± 1.32% 2.863 ± 0.74% 
700000 98 ± 1.85% 1.486 ± 0.84% 
800000 98 ± 1.21% 1.990 ± 0.90% 
900000 99 ± 0.45% 0.025 ± 0.12% 
1000000 99 ± 0.12% 0.011 ± 0.34% 
TABLE I 
PROTOCOL FEATURES 
Features  Description 
VEL Velocity 
DIST Change of Distance 
PCR  Change of Route entries (%)  
PSTC Change of Traffic (%) 
PCH Change of Number of Hops (%) 
  
DSR, DSDV, AODV 
PCB Change of Bad Routes (%) 
PCU Change of Updated Routes (%) 
PCS Change of Stale Routes (%) 
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destinations in DSDV and AODV. Furthermore, our data is collected by route caches, 
and traffic patterns of each node. The collection modules used a tree structure with a 
height of h = 20 to store data where the height value was selected based on the 
performance of the node. The simulation environment is illustrated in figure 5. 
Our simulation environment consists of a large number of nodes that are moving in 
a random walk basis [15]. Some nodes are subject to route logic compromise, traffic 
pattern distortion and denial of service attacks. In particular, some nodes are considered 
that their route logic has somehow being compromised. Some other nodes receive 
distorted traffic and some other nodes are unavailable to routing information. In all three  
attacks the number of nodes varies that are subject to attacks.  
To test our models, we have used several test scripts to generate traces based on 
their running time. The trace running time varies from 100,000 to 1,000,000 seconds 
increasing by 100,000 seconds each time (Tables II, III, IV). For each result, we run the 
simulation 15-times and we report its average and error. In Tables II, III, and IV the 
experimental results demonstrate that an anomaly detection approach can work well on 
different ad-hoc networks. Even though the model has been trained with a small trace 
(100,000 sec), it has already proved satisfactory, so that it is more effective for a much 
longer trace (1,000,000sec).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using network connection data anomaly detection can be very effective against 
single and multi-connection-based port scan and DDoS attacks. This shows that there 
are no natural limits on detection capabilities as in [16, 20, 23, 25] when cooperation of 
collection and detection on the ad-hoc operating layers is achieved. With our 
multilayered data collection and detection, anomaly detection performance and 
particularly the detection rate is high in DSR (99 ± 0.12%), AODV(99 ± 0.01%), and 
DSDV(98 ± 0.22%). Even when the mobility level was changed, the low false alarm 
rate remained constant in DSR (0.011 ± 0.34%), AODV (0.561 ± 0.12%), DSDV (0.124 ± 0.89%). 
TABLE III 
DETECTION PERFORMANCE ON AODV 
Running 
Time (s) 
Detection Rate False Alarm Rate 
100000 93 ± 4.12% 4.455 ± 0.36% 
200000 94 ± 4.43% 4.311 ± 0.67% 
300000 94 ± 3.15% 3.689 ± 0.24% 
400000 95 ± 3.43% 3.836 ± 0.98% 
500000 96 ± 3.78% 3.023 ± 0.56% 
600000 97 ± 2.12% 2.287 ± 0.83% 
700000 97 ± 2.74% 2.401 ± 0.14% 
800000 98 ± 1.45% 1.750 ± 0.98% 
900000 98 ± 1.86% 1.425 ± 0.60% 
1000000 99 ± 0.01% 0.561 ± 0.12% 
TABLE IV 
DETECTION PERFORMANCE ON DSDV 
Running  
Time (s) 
Detection Rate False Alarm Rate 
100000 93 ± 4.58% 3.636 ± 0.78% 
200000 93 ± 3.45% 3.541 ± 0.12% 
300000 94 ± 3.87% 2.648 ± 0.97% 
400000 94 ± 2.34% 2.133 ± 0.34% 
500000 95 ± 2.64% 1.658 ± 0.98% 
600000 95 ± 2.32% 1.836 ± 0.12% 
700000 96 ± 1.63% 1.326 ± 0.41% 
800000 96 ± 1.35% 0.867 ± 0.09% 
900000 97 ± 0.27% 0.436 ± 0.34% 
1000000 98 ± 0.22% 0.124 ± 0.89% 
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It is obvious from the above results that the anomaly detection performs well in all 
the three routing protocols. It was expected that DSR and AODV would behave slightly 
better since anomaly detection works better on a routing protocol in which a degree of 
redundancy exists within its infrastructure [5, 7, 22]. For example, the DSR and AODV 
route updates depend on the traffic demand, which makes it possible to establish 
relationships between the routing activities and the traffic pattern. In contrast, DSDV 
has a very weak correlation between control traffic and data traffic, even when the 
traffic feature is preserved. Coming to a conclusion, our approach seems to perform 
well on both on-demand and proactive protocols. This is due to a carefully selected 
secret function f (k) (Eq. 7). 
Several f (k) functions were selected for our experiments; functions approaching the 
y-axis of the xy-plane; functions approaching the x-axis of the xy-plane; and functions 
dividing the xy-plane approximately into two halves. It was noticed that functions 
approaching the x-axis performed slightly better for all three protocols since route 
caches, traffic patterns and movements generated data models with small y-values.  
 
5 Conclusions 
Since ad-hoc networks can be formed, merged together or partitioned into separate 
networks on the fly, it is essential to detect intrusions by malicious and compromised 
nodes during the network’s normal operation. In an ad-hoc network, it is also critical to 
inform neighbouring nodes for their potential compromised status. Due to the different 
nature of such networks, an intrusion detection component designed to operate in an ad-
hoc node should not introduce new weaknesses to the system, should run continuously 
and should remain transparent to the system.  
Our proposed intrusion detection framework is enabled with the main operations of 
ad-hoc networking at the OSI link and network layers. It makes use of local agents that 
collect, analyze audit data and distribute a compromised status to the neighbouring 
nodes for further assessment.  The collection and detection modules use tree structures 
and Lagrange polynomial interpolation to assemble and discover intrusions from 
malicious and/or compromised nodes in the ad-hoc network. The alert module utilizes 
linear threshold schemes to inform neighbouring nodes for their status. Our only 
assumption in the alert module is that the computation of discrete logs in a finite field is 
intractable.  
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The main requirements of anomaly detection models and intrusion detection systems 
in general is a low false positive rate, calculated as the percentage of normalcy 
variations detected as anomalies, and a high true positive rate, calculated as the 
percentage of anomalies detected. It was shown that our approach has a high true 
positive rate (min = 98%) and a very low false positive rate (max = 0.5%) in both 
proactive and on-demand routing protocols, such as DSR, AODV and DSDV.   
We believe that LIDF performs well since we take advantage of the main operations 
of ad-hoc networking in a layered approach and it will have a positive impact in the 
field of intrusion detection for ad-hoc networks. In the future, we intent to integrate our 
approach to hybrid ad hoc and heterogeneous networks in combination with biometric 
templates for intrusion detection. 
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